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ABSTRACT. In this essay I examine the figure of dissident thought in the contexts 
of philosophical, jurisprudential and political thought. I connect dissidence to the 
concept of dissent and its linguistic cognates including “disagreement” and “opposi- 
tion,” but also the logic of negation in order to examine dissent as a condition of 
discourse. In the second and third sections I argue for dissent as a philosophy of 
non-agreement and review a theory of dissent in law. Finally, I speculate on the 
history of dissent and dissidence from local contexts to its first wave of global 
protest with the development of new social movements and the counter-culture of 
the 1960s and 1970s in order to postulate the changed conditions of dissent in a 
global, digital, mediatized world. In a postscript I ask whether there are a set of 
counter-conducts (Davidson, 2011) or counter-practices that can encourage a second 
wave of global protest, new forms of civic engagement and disobedience. 
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Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, 
the type of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; 
the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish 
true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; 
the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; 
the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. 
--Michel Foucault (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings, 1972–1977. New York, Pantheon, p. 131. 
 
Introduction: Dissent and Negation as a Condition of Discourse  
 
Everywhere the structures of repression of the dominant group against 
minorities, of racial, sexual and gender violence, of state totalitarianism 
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against the citizen, engender sparks of dissidence that leads to a person, move- 
ment, literature, discourse or a form of scholarship that actively challenges 
an established doctrine, policy, law or institution to call out against unlawful 
violations of free speech and “human rights.” Dissident thought is that which 
takes place against conformism and consensus in the name of the good of 
society. It is a critical principle of science, politics and discourse. It may be 
an underground activity that exposes the secrets and the contradictions of 
governments and subjects fellow citizens to moral triage in opposing the 
unjust, often resulting in hardship, punishment, exile and imprisonment.  
The anthropology of dissidence can both theorize and document the strug- 
gles on the ground in totalitarian Soviet Russia, East Europe or China or 
against the cultural imperialism of the West through the diverse activities of 
politics, theatre, literature or poetry. It can also reflect on the nature of  
dissident thought as a form of public discourse and academic scholarship 
that is the consequence of outspoken public intellectuals who through their 
practice dissent and refuse the brutal and arbitrary application of power.  
Globalization has given birth to its own geographical and historical forms of 
protest, against “free trade,” against “austerity,” against tyrannical dictator- 
ships, against finance capitalism and the greed of Wall St that led to the 
Global Financial Crisis. These contemporary protests – the Occupy move- 
ment, the Arab Spring, anti-capitalist rallies, anti-globalization mobilizations 
– have learned from and utilized new forms of protest and discourse of the 
first wave (the free speech and student movements, the peace movement, 
Black civil rights and later the anti-Apartheid movement, the feminist and 
gay movements) to broaden the politics of nonviolent protest to create 
imaginative public pedagogies (McKenna & Darder, 2011). 
Dissident thought has a kinship relationship with the ecology of concepts 
that proceed from the concepts of dissent and the very possibility of disagree- 
ment as an inherent aspect of discourse. It has taken many different forms in 
relation to discourse thought and action, and encompassed and cultivated 
political norms associated with freedom of speech that allows the expression 
of opposition, protest, revolt, and the expression of anti-establishment thought 
that takes the form of civil disobedience, non-violent protest and sometimes 
revolutionary activity. Often this opposition has taken the form of the meta- 
physics of negation brought back to life as an operating principle by Hegel 
but seen by some to be an intrinsic aspect of being and communication.  
Daniel Dahlstrom (2010) in his Presidential Address to the Metaphysical 
Society of America, suggests 
 
Negation is something that we do. It is typically a judgment that 
we make, a judgment that something is not the case, and it usually 
– albeit by no means exclusively – takes the form of a statement… 
Negations … are commonplace, in our lives and in our grammar, 
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and they may well be a distinctive feature of human communication. 
Almost two decades ago Jon Barwise made the observation: ‘All 
human languages contain one or more mechanisms of a negative 
character; no animal communication does’ (p. 247, my italics). 
 
In reference to Wittgenstein he takes up the matter of the constitutive impor- 
tance of negation in logic, in determining truth, and in the very possibility of 
human thinking: 
 
Consider how Wittgenstein, with the Sheffer stroke, introduced a 
negation operation to generate all truth functions. Whether one 
analyzes knowledge claims as suitably justified or as reliable true 
beliefs, it hardly suffices to show that someone believes what is 
the case; for both epistemological theories, it must be shown that 
either the reasons an alleged knower has for his true belief or the 
behavior he exhibits rule out beliefs to the contrary. Thus, negation 
appears to be a primitive element of our processes of thinking and 
knowing anything (p. 248).1   
 
Dissent is a fundamental element of discourse and of discursive practice. In 
the history of discourse there has always been a crucial role for dissidence and 
contestation even with the most long-standing and sedimentary discourses in 
theology, philosophy and the law. Discourse always contains an element of 
openness that allows for new interpretations to challenge and destabilize old 
established views to leave room for transformation and normative change in 
our linguistic habits and discursive practices. This transformation bought 
about by dissent takes place against the consensus and agreement in practice 
that characterize the conceptual background of our discursive practices. Our 
linguistic practices, as Wittgenstein (1953; 1969) made clear in Philosophical 
Investigations and On Certainty are cultural practices (in a deep sense of 
agreement in practice) and normative, embedded in rule-following activity that 
is always open to change and to contestation. These rules are revisable and 
capable of transformation where dissidence has an important role to play. 
José Medina (2010) finds this interpretation in the thinking behind Witt- 
genstein’s rule-following argument and his account of language: 
 
our agreement in language should be thought of as historically 
extended and as remaining always open to challenges and transfor- 
mations. And the open and changeable nature of our background 
consensus does affect the normativity of our practices: its falli- 
bility, its lack of finality. Our normative assessments are never 
final and unrevisable. The correctness of our linguistic actions can 
always be challenged; our moves in language-games can always be 
normatively assessed in different ways. This openness to contesta- 
tion is grounded in the openness to correction of our normative 
agency. Our language-games are not composed of moves whose 
correctness can be guaranteed once and for all; they are not activ- 
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ities that can be exempted from critical scrutiny. In other words, 
language-games are not self-justifying activities with absolute 
normative autonomy (p. 8). 
 
Dissent and “dissidence,” defined here as a form of thought that challenges 
the status quo, are necessary elements in discursive change; they represent 
principles of historical dynamism in the expression of thought that represents 
both the new and original without which the orders of discourse would be 
self-stultifying.2 
The term dissidence is most often associated with Russian, Central and 
East European movements opposing the regime in the Soviet Union, begin- 
ning in the 1960s and culminating, perhaps, in the statement by Vaclav Havel 
(1985: 23):  
 
[Dissent] is a natural and inevitable consequence of the present 
historical phase of the [Communist] system it is haunting. It was 
born at a time, when this system, for a thousand reasons, can no 
longer base itself on the unadulterated, brutal, and arbitrary appli- 
cation of power, eliminating all expressions of nonconformity. 
What is more, the system has become so ossified politically that 
there is practically no way for such nonconformity to be implemented 
within its official structures.3   
 
Dissent is not confined to an historical era or to the nature of totalitarian or 
closed political systems. It is a universal feature of human life, thinking and 
discourse that provides the first principle of criticism realized in a formal 
sense by Kant but constitutive of the negative – the “No” – and logically 
related to the affirmative – the “Yes” – that drives the system of discourse 
and creates the regime of true statements and the possibility of opinion. 
 
Dissent as a Philosophy of Non-Agreement 
 
Dissent is the main principle of opposition classically conceived, a philos- 
ophy of non-agreement that makes opposition to a prevailing idea, policy or 
institution central to public and political discourse. Dissent is structurally or 
formally enabled in political systems through opposition parties often 
accompanied by social or political activism and forms of civil disobedience 
organized by those called “dissidents,” where it is not entirely suppressed 
and driven underground by repressive regimes. Dissent in this sense as a 
principle of public discourse in a democracy rests on and is dependent on 
freedom of thought framed by freedom of speech that enshrines the pos- 
sibility of dissent as a useful working political methodology that enable the 
expression of dissenting ideas especially from minorities against a majority 
consensus. The coercive elimination of dissent, the active silencing of the 
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minority opposition is the apparatus of the police state that tries to preserve a 
one-party mythological unity that leads to propaganda, manipulation of news 
media, and the rigid control of official voices. The abolition of dissent is 
institutionalized in a monological pedagogy that cultivates the production of 
pupils as ideology-receptacles. Dialogical pedagogy, by contrast, rests on the 
possibility and encouragement of disagreement. Dissent is the first stage of 
criticism and a necessary adjunct of  critique and other public forms of dis- 
course that challenge existing authorities, deviate from the official narratives, 
proposing their counter-narratives and releasing subjugated knowledges and 
identities. 
Dissent is also the living force that enables dissident thought to take the 
form of criticism beginning as textual commentary and leading to interpre- 
tation that opposes or takes its departure from established thought. In the 
modern sense criticism is born with the three Kantian critiques as inquiries 
into the very possibility of knowledge. 
The Kantian critique is different from the classic Hegelian critique which 
issues from nay-saying, from the contradiction and the force of negation that 
define the dialectic. Judith Butler (2009) usefully defines the meanings of 
critique for Kant: 
 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant lays out several meanings 
and functions of critique, including the dethroning of metaphysics, 
the overcoming of what he called the reign of tedium (a perpetual 
altercation between skepticism and dogmatism), an effort to supply 
sufficient grounding for the sciences, the attempt to establish a 
way of deriving knowledge claims from a priori principles, and a 
way of distinguishing such claims from empirical ones as well as 
speculative ones. Critique is also described as a kind of revolution, 
what he calls a revolution at the level of procedure, a progressive 
path for science, a way of enforcing rightful claims, of protecting 
the public against harmful doctrines (especially those that involve 
contradiction, groping [Herumtappen], and excess), and a way of 
resisting popularity and yet serving the public (p. 777). 
 
Most importantly, as Butler explains Kant is also highlighting a question 
with regard to the mode of self-legitimation of any project of knowledge: “in 
what way?” and “by what right?” (p. 778). Kant’s critique is an inquiry into 
the very possibility of knowledge and the capacity of human reason to be 
able to undertake it. 
For Hegel, by contrast, the power of “negation” constitutes the dynamic 
aspect of the dialectic as it is only through “negativity” that we can move 
beyond static or habitual thought to dissolve it and then move on toward “the 
whole”. The power of negation drives the dialectical process by revealing 
contradictions within any category or identity although Hegel’s notion of the 
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dialectic does not stand for simple opposition. He challenges the notion of 
self-identity given classically in identity theory as A=A. By contrast Hegel 
talks of a set of relations including difference, opposition, reflection or rela- 
tion. On his logic through the power of negation categories are sometimes 
shown to be self-contradictory. His Science of Logic (1817) reveals three 
different kinds of contradiction: Being/Nothing (Quality/Quantity); in the 
division of Essence, Inner/Outer where to define one is at the same time to 
define the Other; and with Concept we have examples where component parts 
are conceptually interrelated such as with the concept of identity comprised 
of Universality and Particularity. Negation is the force that drives the logic 
of the dialectic in its simple organic form: thesis, antithesis, synthesis.4 
Marx admired the Hegelian dialectic while criticizing the system and 
recommending it as the first modern political economy: 
 
The outstanding achievement of Hegel’s Phänomenologie and of 
its final outcome, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and 
generating principle, is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-
creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of 
the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation; 
that he thus grasps the essence of labour and comprehends objective 
man – true, because real man – as the outcome of man’s own 
labour.5  
 
The nihil of Russian nihilism is also a form of negation. It is only one 
species of nihilism that dates back to the Greek philosopher Gorgias where 
negation was cultivated as an expression of meaninglessness. Typically 
nihilism takes a variety of forms: metaphysical (no objects), epistemological 
(only skepticism), moral (no morality), existential (no intrinsic value) or 
political (no authority). Russian nihilism was a movement in the 1860s that 
rejected all political authority and sanction violence as a means of political 
change.  
The term was used by Friedrich Jacobi to characterize the rationalism of 
Kant’s critique whose idealism fell into nihilism according to Jacobi, and it 
was Ivan Turgenev who popularized the term in Fathers and Sons (1862), 
soon after adopted by the Russian movement. Nietzsche’s decisive reading 
becoming explicit in his Notebooks saw the death of God as an event that no 
longer guaranteed the meaning or purpose of life. Both his work and 
Heidegger’s interpretation of it in “The History of European Nihilism” the 
fourth book of his monumental Nietzsche emphasizes the Will to Power as 
the expression of the death of God and the devaluation of the highest values. 
It is an interpretation that allows Heidegger to talk of Western metaphysics 
as essential nihilistic in that is has forgotten Being (Sein) mistaking it for a 
Being (Seiende).  
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This reading view the history of Western thought as Western metaphysics 
as the destruction of Being. The “no,” the “negation” inherent in this version 
of the nihil is a powerful source of dissent and of dissident thought disrupt- 
ing the traditional hierarchy of values, challenging the self-aggrandizing 
mythology used to buttress the timeless truths of the West, and through this 
negation opening up the West for an alternative set of futures. Nietzsche and 
Heidegger’s interpretation set out a new discursive game in philosophy that 
can talk of creation within a nonfoundational universe and it acts as a source 
of inspiration for Sartre, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Vattimo, Rorty, Severino 
and many others.6  
Nietzsche’s work has inspired various accounts of nonfoundational thought 
and ethics in characterizations like Vattimo’s “weak thought.” “Negative 
thought” is a movement founded by Massimo Cacciari to identify the fail- 
ures of traditional logic to explicate the problems of modernity. Caccciari in 
Krisis (1976) and Negative Thinking and Rationalization (1977) finds his 
locus in Nietzsche, Wittgenstein and Heidegger to confirm the end of clas- 
sical rationality and a refounding in “negative thinking.” Matteo Mandarini 
(2009: 38) argues Cacciari’s Krisis  
 
was central to the development of a number of subsequent ten- 
dencies in Italian philosophy, political theory and political practice, 
is attested to by its influence on the development of ‘weak thought’ 
(pensiero debole) and, more importantly, on the notion of the 
‘autonomy of the political’ as adopted by some of the leading 
intellectuals of the Italian Communist Party… 
 
For me the most definitive of the French Nietzsche revival was Deleuze 
whose book Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962) paved the way for a concept of 
“dissident thought,” together with Foucault’s materialization of discourse 
and Roland Barthes’ nouvelle critique. Each of these proposed useful 
accounts of “dissident thought” that broadened and diversified the practice, 
ethos and institution of criticism. In each case the formal oppositional view- 
point is amplified and given new strength and direction.  
Barthes argues that literary criticism if it is to function as (nouvelle) 
critique and as the new master discourse of the academy, it must transcend 
its tradition role as simply making a judgment about literature in relation to 
its norms and conventions to criticize the language and the language games 
of the institution beyond reinforcing the academic doxa and the status quo of 
the institution. The rise of cultural studies starts as a consequence of the 
shutting down of conventional academic discourse as a result of the market 
agenda of the corporate university. Some would argue that the attempt to 
radicalized institutional critique has long failed and the abdication of cultural 
studies has left the university with no critical force to subject neoliberal 
power to analysis or effective critique. In this context “dissident thought” 
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differs from the Enlightenment emphasis on consensus but looks to dissensus. 
It is not tuned to a convergence but exists only as a divergence and diversity 
of thought.7 
 
A Theory of Dissent in Jurisprudence 
 
The structural role of dissent and disagreement in discourse is also recognized 
in legal discourse and the making of the law. Thomas Morawetz (1992) 
provides a Wittgensteinian understanding of the possibility of “disagreement” 
in jurisprudence. Writing in 1992 Morawetz explains the move from the old 
foundationalist jurisprudence motivated by the possibility of achieving a 
consensus on public values and social progress to a new skeptical and anti- 
foundationalist jurisprudence that has fallen under the spell of philosophical 
arguments about language, truth and meaning, originating in Wittgenstein and 
played out by Richard Rorty in a rebuttal of “knowledge as accurate repre- 
sentation.” The transition to the new jurisprudence takes place through three 
“destabilization arguments:” the moral argument destabilizes liberalism faith 
in public values through an assault on the objectivity of rights; “the con- 
ceptual argument impeaches ideological neutrality by uncovering multiple 
narratives and alternative voices that coexist in time and space and offer 
irreconcilable ways of ordering experience. Finally, the semantic argument 
undercuts communication with deconstructive arguments that characterize 
meaning as hearer-determined” (p. 376). After an exhaustive review of the 
arguments for law as a deliberative practice he concludes: 
 
If Wittgenstein is right, and if philosophy ‘leaves everything as it 
is,’ then describing law as a deliberative practice can be neither 
conservative nor radical. The law itself, the deliberative practice 
that is law, will be conservative if the society is homogeneous or 
successfully repressive, if new voices and ways of thinking remain 
unrepresented. The law will be radical if society is heterogeneous 
and new ways of justifying and conceiving aims are continually 
given legal expression. The law will, furthermore, be liberal in Mill’s 
sense whenever it is open to new ways of thinking, whenever 
judges recognize that their ways of reasoning and justifying, i.e. 
their stake, do not necessarily have hegemony (p. 456). 
 
In the age of globalization, the concept of international law throws up a new 
set of problems about disagreement and specifically what some scholars 
regard as incommensurable problems with different conceptions of law such 
as the radical difference between Western and Shar’ia law. The ground shifts 
when considering law and opposition within the US.  
M. Todd Henderson charts the opposition to dissent by John Roberts as 
Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court who sees it as weakening the Court 
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by exposing internal divisions and also thus also weakening the Rule of Law.  
The hostility to dissent has a history in the Court but some justices, “most 
famously Chief Justice Stone and Justice William Brennan, dissent is con- 
sidered a healthy, and even necessary, practice that improves the way in which 
law is made” (p. 2.). As Henderson goes on to explain: 
 
Their counter-position rests in part on two ideas: first, dissents 
communicate legal theories to other justices, lawyers and political 
actors, state courts, and future justices, and have sometimes turned 
into good law later on as a result of this; and second, dissents are 
essential to reveal the deliberative nature of the Court, which in 
turn improves its institutional authority and legitimacy within 
American governance (p. 2). 
 
He argues that “the elimination of dissents would not move the Court in the 
direction of a more efficient or perfected state of discourse” (p. 2) and refer- 
ring to Foucault on truth and power, “Style reflects power, and the Court’s 
choice of style is about the Court’s power” (p. 2). Henderson usefully 
hypothesizes a theory of dissent beginning with Foucault’s assertion “the 
characteristic of our Western societies [is] that the language of power is law” 
 
But the law does much more than this. Law constructs much of 
modern discourse, since it authorizes some to speak and some views 
to be taken seriously, while others are marginalized, derided, ex- 
cluded, or even prohibited. The law creates discourse that affects 
all citizens through the creation of ‘episteme’ – historically endur- 
ing discursive regularities that act as perception grids within which 
thought, communication, and action can occur (p. 5). 
 
In examining the relations between discourse, power and truth in the making 
of law Henderson maintains “Historically the word ‘truth’ was synonymous 
with ‘fact’ or ‘actuality’” (p. 7) and he goes on to argue: 
 
Law is one of the most powerful discourses in that it claims not 
only to reveal the truth, like science, but also to consecrate it as the 
Law, the sole source of legitimate physical power. In this context, 
an appellate opinion is a source of truth and a representation of 
power, not so much as an evaluation of the ‘facts’ of a particular 
case, but rather what ‘facts’ are acceptable within the legal grid that 
the court creates (ibid). 
 
In the context of a brief history of dissent he reviews three models of ways in 
which courts has delivered their judgments in the course of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence: the English model where the seriatim delivery of the judg- 
ment of each judge individually; delivering an “opinion of the court;” and 
the modern US practice where judges decide individually whether to “write 
separately.” His history demonstrates that “the history of debates about the 
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opinion delivery practices of Anglo-American courts has been about court 
power” (p. 48) mostly about restricting its power. 
 
Dissidence and Dissent in Political Life: The 1960s Counterculture  
 
The history of dissident thought in the West and the meaning of opposition 
was part of the dialectics of the Cold War and the organized radicalism that 
took place in the 1950s to formulate an anti-Stalinist Left, a living embodi- 
ment of dissent based on the power of critique.8 Much of the organized 
radicalism appeared under the acceptable face of democratic socialism that had 
imbibed the principles of dissent from various forms of Western Marxism.9 
The 1960s counterculture was not confined to the US or the West. Its 
radical underpinnings were in decolonization movements initiated by Gandhi’s 
philosophy of non-violence, the work of Fanon, Césaire, and other “post- 
colonial” luminaries who sparked movements against imperialism. There were 
many peasant uprisings in the medieval and eras,10 often part of broader 
indigenous movements against the confiscation of land, racial discrimination, 
and new forms of colonial domination that began with first contact in the 
Americas and ex-European colonies and have developed substantially in the 
era of anti-globalization movements.11 
Radical movements in the post-war that began in the US and Europe 
spread quickly to South America, the Eastern bloc and the Antipodes. The 
American civil rights movement under Martin Luther King Jr. initiated pro- 
test action to end the official segregation and disenfranchisement of African-
Americans, and later produced radical groups such as Black Power movement, 
Black Panther Party and Black Muslims. “Postcolonialism” was coming of 
age at least in the sense that many countries in Africa and Asia had recently 
received their independence and authors such as Frantz Fanon and Aimé 
Césaire, as well as the Harlem Renaissance poets, had been rediscovered. It 
was also the beginning of protest against apartheid in South Africa. In this 
regard we should not forget the “race riots” in Watts (34 people killed in 
1966), Detroit (1967) and Cleveland. This era was also the beginning of the 
official recognition of multiculturalism as a policy (although actual policies 
did not emerge until the early1970s and first in Canada in response to the 
demands of the Quebecois). 
The 1960s also heralded an age of mass protest against the Vietnam War 
and US foreign policy in the late 1960s which grew out of the 1950s “peace 
movement” and CND that radicalized a generation of student-youth, based 
mostly in universities, that eventually led to resistance to the war and the 
shootings at Kent State University in May 1970 (where four students were 
killed and many others wounded by the National Guard). In this connection, 
we should also note the Free Speech movement that began at Berkeley in 
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1964 emphasizing student’s rights to free speech and academic freedom, and 
protesting against a ban limiting political activities. Associated with these 
movements – Black and student movements – the 1960s also saw the birth of 
the New Left, which was an imported rhetoric that had little basis in the 
labor movement or, indeed, Marxist politics on the ground but, nevertheless 
inspired student protest and linked the US with movements elsewhere devel- 
oping a significant global civic awareness. 
Second-wave feminism took root and initiated action to improve women’s 
rights and gender equality. This period in feminism saw the development of 
radical feminist theory that theorized patriarchy and held CR groups among 
women across class divisions to focus not only on economic equality, sexual 
harassment, maternity leave and affirmative action but also greater control 
over women’s health and sexuality, including “reproduction politics,” “pro-
choice,” radical lesbianism and sexual experimentation. The women’s move- 
ment coincided with the birth of the gay rights movement that sought greater 
equality for lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgenders. The Stonewall riots 
in New York in 1969, involving violent conflict between police and homosex- 
uals in a Greenwich Village gay bar, is generally taken as the beginning of 
modern gay rights, leading to the formation of the Gay Liberation Front, gay 
pride celebrations and marches, and a new era of sexual politics that ques- 
tioned gender identity, “normalcy” of sexual orientation and the extent of 
societal homophobia. 
Informing these movements and being shaped by them, the 1960s became 
synonymous with emergent, novel and experimental cultural forms, especially 
revolving popular music and the rapid growth of youth subcultures. This 
“alternative culture” was to some extent the inheritor of Black music, 1950s 
experimentation, the Beat Generation, and the associated perceived “teenage 
crises” and “moral panics.” Musically, the era is perhaps often symbolized by 
Bob Dylan’s “The Times They Are A-changin’,” which crystallized the polit- 
ical and ethical break with the mainstream. Dylan, drawing on the American 
folk tradition symbolized by Woody Guthrie, provided a new lyricism 
combining poetic and philosophical elements that commented on what was 
happening and challenged the political status quo.  
In a strong sense this first global movement of dissidence based on the 
export of countercultural youth styles around the globe also set the condition 
and tone for the second and third global movements: the anti-capitalist and 
anti-globalization struggles of 1990s and 2000s, a kind of rainbow coalition 
with a strong ecology and sustainability orientation,12 and; the movement of 
cyberactivism that grew from the hacker cultures of the 1960s (Levy, 1984) 
dedicated to the principle of free information to its maturity in the work of 
Richard Stallman and Linus Torvalds, as intellectual leaders of the openness 
movement. 
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Postscript: Dissent in the Age of Digital Reason 
 
At a recent conference devoted to the history and meaning of opposition from 
1968 to the present (see footnote 4), the Research Group on International 
Studies frames the issue in terms of the diversity of forms of protest and of 
historical continuity: 
 
Globalization, post-9/11 politics and the post-2008 financial crisis 
have all birthed modes and histories of opposition and dissent, be 
they dissent from global political-economic systems or opposition 
to ranges of international authoritarian regimes. Contemporary 
dissent, however, oft-draws from forms and imaginations of earlier 
modes of protest, be they student protests from the late ‘60s onward, 
the peace movement in the same period, the anti-nukes movement 
of the 1980s or the anti-Apartheid movement spanning the ‘60s, 
‘70s and ‘80s. Still, dissent takes other historical forms: individual 
critiques of ‘actually existing’ socialist systems, be they civil 
rights based critique from individual figures such as Sakharov or 
Rostropovich (or Solzhenitsyn’s nationalist-culturalism), media-
driven dissent, such as the political magazine Mladina’s criticisms 
of the Yugoslav regime in the late 1980s and early 1990s or the 
voices of “everyday” social actors, such as the Damas de Blanco 
in Cuba. In a historical period encapsulating the last decades of the 
Cold War and an unfolding twenty-first century, dissent and social 
opposition undergo and have undergone redefinition within the 
confines of modern and contemporary culture. 
 
Arguably, dissent and dissidence previously local and confined to regions 
and repressive states developed its first wave of global protest beginning 
with the Peace movement in the 1950s leading to the development of new 
social movements and the counter-culture of the 1960s and 1970s. This was 
perhaps its first global expression as a culture of protest that institutionalized 
itself within liberal democratic orders. Yet with the changed conditions of 
dissent in a global, digital, mediatized world we need to ask whether there 
are a set of counter-conducts (after Foucault, Davidson, 2011) or counter-
practices that can encourage a second wave of global protest, new forms of 
civic engagement and disobedience. In the age of digital reason (Peters, 
2014) in what ways is resistance possible within the global mode of digital 
governmentality that subjects us to new horizontal and democratic forms of 
control where self-surveillance parallels the digital panopticon of big data 
systems and surveillance technologies both the State and the digital multi- 
national corporation? 
In an interview with Jordan Skinner, Frédéric Gros the editor and com- 
mentator of Foucault’s works, (Skinner, 2014) makes an observation about 
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the continued relevance of Foucault’s work to thought and action in the 
digital age’s universe of generalized surveillance. He comments: 
 
Foucault’s great studies of disciplinary society are useful above all 
because they allow us to delineate, through contrast and compar- 
ison, the digital governmentality that subjects us to new forms of 
control, which are less vertical, more democratic and, above all, 
no longer burdened by any anthropological ballast. Homo digitalis 
today participates in, is the primary agent of, the surveillance of 
himself. Digital society is becoming a form of mutualised control. 
We should today consider the treatment of ‘big data’ working with 
Foucault, basing ourselves on him, but seeing further than he 
could. Because we have gone well beyond the disciplinary age. 
Security’s new concepts are no longer imprisoning individuals and 
normative consciousness, but rather traceability and algorithmic 
profiling.13 
 
Gros also mentions the other great aspect of Foucault’s thought that focuses 
on the genealogy of subjectivity and the self but without relating it to the new 
global digital systems that have the power to recast identity in new digital 
forms through the power of surveillance and through the surveillance carried 
out by the State in conjunction with large information utilities that increasingly 
profile and “personalize” individuals as market segments or niches. 
In the digital age prodemocracy movements are different from those in 
the “1989” era in Soviet Russia and China as they are increasingly protests 
arising within the global surveillance global system spawning new forms of 
cyberactivism and civil disobedience, championed by the new cyber-dissidents 
like Edward Snowden and Julian Lassange adopting a human rights approach 
to global freedoms in the digital world.14 At the same time social media have 
functioned as tools for political coordination especially for youth involved in 
the so-called Arab Spring that igniting historically irreversible political change 
brought down strongman dictatorships and oppressive and corrupt one-party 
regimes.15 While the Arab Spring has turned to dust, consuming its indig- 
enous form of a social democratic promise into a new series of takeovers and 
mass protests, it demonstrated in new form of dissidence based on cyber-
based disobedience in a political arena seemingly immune to change where 
civil rights, especially for women, have been strongly resisted and completed 
denied in some cases. It also demonstrated the vulnerabilities of oppressive 
regimes to world information flows and new forms of citizen journalism in 
an increasingly interconnected world. In this new media environment dis- 
sidence often takes a digital aesthetic form so that it is appropriate to talk of 
new “styles” of dissidence demonstrated by Pussy Riot’s civic disobedience 
in the Post-Soviet context (Tchermalykh, 2014).16 
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In these new forms of dissidence that increasingly define prodemocracy, 
ecological movements, and cyberactivism, political subjectivity depends on 
the global linking of autonomous cells and regional networks in transversal 
and rhizomic structures that favor horizontal, non-hierarchical and transspecies  
connections (Peters, 2013). These networks of hope are the emergent 
counter-practices and counter-conducts that speak truth to power in the 
emergent interconnected digital world that is now our home. 
 
Acknowledgement  
My thanks to Tina Besley, Michael Apple and E. Jayne White for helpful comments 
on earlier drafts of this paper. A version of this paper appeared in Etnografie del 




1. The Sheffer stroke (after Henry Sheffer) in propositional calculus denotes the 
function of negation, often expressed as “not both.” In Boolean algebra it is called 
the NAND operation and represented by “I” or an upwards arrow “↑,” such as 
as A | B, Dpq, or A ↑ B). 
2. See Terry Eagleton’s (2003) popular account which is not theorized but rather 
a series of profiles or sketches of dissidents that embraces the widest sense of the 
term.  
3. See Yaroslav Bilinsky’s account at http://www.answers.com/topic/dissident-
movement#ixzz3Ay2Tli8W. See also Solzhenitsyn (1985), Rubenstein (1985) and 
especially Aviezer (2000) on the philosophy and politics of Czech dissidence. 
4. See https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlconten.htm  
5. “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy” in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts 
of 1844 (XXIII), https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/ 
hegel.htm  
6. In this context it is important to acknowledge Sartre’s towering contribution to 
forms of civil protest in France during the post-war period a form of atheistic and 
existential humanism that later gave way to dissident Marxism especially in The 
Critique of Dialectical Reason (1991). 
7. See Lyotard’s (1988) The Différend and Rancière’s (2011) “The Thinking of 
Dissensus.” See my “Lyotard, Nihilism and Education” (Peters, 2006). 
8. The genealogy of critique is an important part of the history of negation – 
from Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche to Sloterdijk and Spivak – as a systematic analysis 
of discourse and theory, involving the faculty of judgment, to examine the validity 
and limits of an argument, to expose its ideological underpinnings. Critique, origi- 
nally a French word, indistinguishable from the concept of “criticism” is the basis 
for use of the term “critical” especially as evidenced in the notion of “Critical 
Theory” that grew up in a German context with founders of the Frankfurt School but 
now no longer tied exclusively to dialectical reason has a public usage broadly 
functioning as a disciplined form of criticism including non-dialectical forms of 
reasoning. 
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9. See the institutional history of the American journal Dissent, founded in 1954 
by Irving Howe by Maurice Isserman (2014) “Steady Work: Sixty Years of Dissent” 
at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/steady-work-sixty-years-of-dissent. 
In this connection see also the recent conference of the Research Group on Inter- 
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Present” (January 16–17, 2014) at http://www.dissent.aau.dk/. The conference 
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Critique of the Liberal University: Postmodernism, Relativism and the Culture Wars” 
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